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Abstract 
The current study examines the extent to which religiosity account for ideological 
orientations in 16 countries from five continents (Australia, Brazil, Chile, Germany, Greece, 
Finland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Poland, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and 
United States). Results showed that religiosity was consistently related to right and conservative 
ideologies in all countries, except Australia. This relation held across different religions, and did not 
vary across participant’s demographic conditions (i.e., gender, age, income, and education). After 
controlling for basic personal values, the contribution of religiosity on ideology was still significant. 
However, the effect was substantial only in countries where religion has played a prominent role in 
the public sphere, like Spain, Poland, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, and Turkey. In the other countries, the 
unique contribution of religiosity was marginal or small. 
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Introduction  
Religion and politics have taken quite different routes in the transition to modernity and 
democracy through the gradual emancipation of political authority from religious legitimation 
(Witte, 2006). However, this transition did not carry the estrangement of religion from public affairs. 
Religion, indeed, continues to play a major role in several societies, although to different degrees 
and in different forms, across countries and generations (Casanova, 1994).  
Research has shown that religiosity still represents a valid predictor of electoral behavior 
and political alignment in most Western democracies (Bruce, 2003; Dalton, 1990, 1996; Inglehart, 
1997; Knutsen, 2004; Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Putnam & Campbell, 2010; Van der Brug, Hobolt 
& De Vreese, 2009). A common finding is that religious individuals are more likely to hold 
conservative views on a wide range of policy issues and are therefore more inclined to vote for 
conservative or right-wing parties (e.g., Cohen et al., 2009; Duriez, Luyten, Snauwaert & 
Hutsebaut, 2002; Malka, Lelkes, Srivastava, Cohen & Miller, 2012). Most religions, indeed, still 
hold in great consideration values like authority and tradition, which are at the core of conservative 
platforms. In addition, most religions have difficulty in facing how liberal platforms handle 
sensitive issues like sex, marriage and abortion.  
The relation between religiosity and political orientation appears to hold across cultural and 
political contexts. For example, using data from the European Social Survey (ESS), Piurko, 
Schwartz and Davidov (2011) found that religious individuals from different countries tend to 
locate themselves more on the right of the political spectrum than non-religious individuals. This 
association was stronger in countries with a major national religion, and where religious practices 
are still widespread, like Greece, Israel, Italy, Poland, and Spain, than in more secular countries, 
like Denmark and the United Kingdom.   
The general picture one may draw from available records, however, is that of a fluid 
situation whose direction and end points are difficult to capture. Whereas secularization has 
pervasively expanded through northern and center European Protestant countries, in traditional 
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Catholic countries like Italy and Spain, and in the Orthodox Greece, the decline of church 
attendance has been less rapid and profound.  
Since religious practice has generally declined among the youth, one can’t predict the extent 
to which previous associations between religiosity and political orientation will continue to hold in 
the future. Among post-communist countries, one can’t assess the health status of Polish 
Catholicism, where religion is still credited with responsibility for resisting and dismantling the 
communist authoritarian regime. The secularization of Israeli society has been counteracted by the 
growing influence of orthodox Jewish, whereas the secularization of Turkey has been relented by 
the new vitality of Islamism. A special reference needs to be made for the United States, where 
different religions make different offers that appeal for different forms of religiosity (Putnam & 
Campbell, 2010).  
The present contribution examines the extent to which religiosity accounts for ideological 
self-placement in 16 countries from 5 continents. It involves secondary analysis of data from a 
cross-national project on the role of values in orienting political preference. With respect to other, 
published manuscripts that used the same set of data (Caprara & Vecchione, 2015; Caprara et al., 
2017; Schwartz et al., 2014; Vecchione et al., 2015), this is the only study that includes religiosity. 
The study extends the literature by including countries such as Australia, Brazil, Chile, 
Japan, and Turkey, that were not considered in previous studies (Cohen et al., 2009; Duriez et al., 
2002; Malka et al., 2012; Piurko et al., 2011). Moreover, the study is novel in addressing the 
distinctive influence that religiosity may exert on ideology after basic values were taken into 
account. Earlier studies have indeed shown systematic associations of value priorities with both 
religiosity (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Saroglou, Delpierre & Dernelle, 2004) and political 
preferences (e.g., Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, Caprara & Vecchione, 2010). Specifically, meta-
analytic evidence has shown that conservation values (e.g., conformity, tradition, and security), 
namely values which express order, self-restriction, and commitment to the customs and ideas of 
traditional culture, are positively related to religious commitment (Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). 
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This finding is consistent across countries with different economic, cultural, and religious 
characteristics (Fontaine, Luyten, & Corveleyn, 2000; Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Saroglou 
et al., 2004). Conservation values are also related to a preference for right-wing and conservative 
ideologies, across different cultural contexts and political systems (Aspelund, Lindeman, & 
Verkasalo, 2013; Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & 
Barbaranelli, 2006; Caprara, Vecchione & Schwartz, 2012; Caprara et al., 2017; Piurko et al., 2011; 
Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan & Shrout, 2007). Thus, the observed link between religiosity and 
political ideology might depend, at least in part, on individual’s value priorities. We aimed to 
disentangle unique and shared effects of religiosity on ideological self-placement.  
In accordance with previous findings (e.g., Malka et al., 2012; Piurko et al., 2011), we 
hypothesized that religiosity would be associated with a preference for right-wing and conservative 
ideologies, due to the importance assigned by most religions to authority and traditional values, and 
in contrast with the emphasis of left-wing and liberal ideologies on individual’s freedom of 
expression (Haidt, 2012). We also expected the association between religiosity and political 
ideology to be stronger in countries with an established religious majority, like Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Israel, and Poland. In such countries, the dominant religion has received special recognition from 
political authorities, and religious institutions have historically exerted considerable influence in 
shaping citizens’ views of society and politics. 
Material and methods 
Participants and Procedures 
This study involved 16 countries: Australia (N = 285), Brazil (N = 995), Chile (N = 415), 
Finland (N = 428), Germany (N = 1066), Greece (N = 374), Israel (N = 478), Italy (N = 557), Japan 
(N = 364), Poland (N = 699), Slovakia (N = 485), Spain (N = 420), Turkey (N = 512), Ukraine (N = 
735), the United Kingdom (N = 469), the United States (N = 543). Overall, the sample comprised 
8,825 individuals (53% female), with a mean age of 40.60 (SD = 14.74). Details about sample 
composition in each country are reported in earlier studies (Caprara et al., 2017, Table 1; Schwartz 
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et al., 2014, Table 2). As described in Schwartz et al. (2014; see also Caprara et al., 2017), a 
representative sample was obtained in Germany and Turkey. In the other 14 countries, researchers 
enlisted university students to gather the data. Questionnaires were administered online in Australia 
and Finland and by telephone in Germany. In the other 14 countries, written self-reports were 
obtained. The same instructions were used for administering the instruments in all countries.  
Measures 
Ideology. Ideology was measured through two indicators. The first was a self-placement 
item on the left-right scale: “In political matters, people sometimes talk about and “the left” and 
"the right" How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?” Alternatives ranged 
from 1 (Left) to 10 (Right), without intermediate labels. The second was a self-placement item on 
the liberal-conservative scale: “In political matters, people sometimes talk about conservatives and 
liberals. How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?”. Alternatives ranged 
from 1 (Extremely liberal) to 7 (Extremely conservative).  
Religiosity. Participants rated their religiosity in response to the question "How religious, if 
at all, do you consider yourself to be?", using an eight-point scale ranging from 0 (not at all 
religious) to 7 (very religious). We adopted this uni-dimensional approach to assessing religiosity 
because it is most appropriate when studying heterogeneous groups from different countries with 
different religious affiliations (Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). 
Values. The Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ, Schwartz, 2006) was used to measure ten 
domains of values, as operationalized in Schwartz's (1992) theory. The PVQ includes 40 short 
verbal portraits of different people matched to the respondents’ gender, each describing a person’s 
goals, aspirations, or wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a value. For each portrait, 
respondents indicate how similar the person is to themselves on a scale ranging from “not like me at 
all” to “very much like me.” Respondents' values were inferred from the implicit values of the 
people they consider similar to themselves. In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha reliabilities, 
averaged across countries, ranged from .56 (Tradition) to .80 (Achievement). Details on the 
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psychometric characteristics properties of the PVQ scales in the present samples were reported in a 
previous study by Vecchione et al. (2015; see also Schwartz et al., 2014). 
Results 
Preliminary data 
Table 1 (first column) reports the mean ratings of religiosity in each country. Since these 
results cannot be regarded as representative of the respective countries, we also reported the results 
of a worldwide survey conducted in 2009 (Table 1, second column). Respondents were asked 
whether religion is important in their daily life, and percentages for "yes" and "no" answers were 
reported (we downloaded the scores from http://news.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-
world-poorest-nations.aspx). Highest percentages were observed in Brazil, Turkey, Poland, Italy, 
and Greece. Lowest percentages were observed in Japan, UK, Finland, and Australia. Spearman 
rank-order correlation between percentage of 'yes' in this survey and mean ratings of religiosity 
observed in the present study across the 16 countries was .68 (p<. 01).  
Religiosity and ideological self-placement 
Table 1 (third and fourth column) reports the correlations of religiosity with the left-right 
(L/R) and the liberal-conservative (L/C) scales. Results showed that religiosity was significantly 
associated with at least one indicator of ideological self-placement in all countries except Australia. 
The same pattern was observed in each country: More religious individuals located themselves 
more to the right and conservative side of the political spectrum than less religious individuals. This 
association was stronger in Israel (r = .46 with L/R, .53 with L/C), Spain (r = .46 with L/R, .48 with 
L/C), Greece (r = .45 with L/R, .38 with L/C), Poland (r = .42 with L/R, .43 with L/C), and Italy (r 
= .39 with L/R, .45 with L/C). 
Religiosity and basic values 
Table 2 reports the pattern of correlations observed in each country between religiosity and 
the whole set of ten values. Results showed that individuals more committed to a religion attributed 
relatively high importance to the conservation values of security, tradition, conformity. Tradition 
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values, in particular, showed the highest positive correlation in most countries, with Pearson’s r 
ranging from .20 (Japan) to .60 (Israel). Religiosity, by contrast, was associated with low 
importance attributed to hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction. 
The unique contribution of religiosity 
A multiple regression was used to assess the unique contribution of religiosity to ideological 
self-placement, controlling for basic values and demographic variables. In this analysis, we used the 
liberal-conservative scale as outcome in the U.K. and the U.S., and the left-right scale in all other 
countries, in accordance with the ideological labels that are most commonly used in each country.  
We first controlled for demographic variables, entering gender, age, income, and education 
in the first step as a single block of predictors. We then entered the ten values in the second step, 
and religiosity at the third step. 
The contribution of demographic variables at the first step was significant in 10 countries 
(first column of Table 3), accounting for a proportion of variance in those countries between .01 
(Ukraine) and .08 (United States). Basic values made an incrementally significant contribution in all 
countries at the second step (second column, Table 3). The proportion of variance uniquely 
accounted for by values ranged between .04 (Slovakia, Ukraine) and .26 (Finland, Italy). In most 
countries, universalism and, to a lesser extent, self-direction values predicted a preference for left 
and liberal ideologies. Security and tradition values predicted a preference for right and 
conservative ideologies.1 In the third step, religiosity accounted for significant additional variance 
in all countries, except for Australia (third column, Table 3). A substantial increment in R-squared 
was observed in Spain, Poland, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, and Turkey. In these countries, religiosity 
added from 6 to 11% of explained variance, after basic values were taken into account. In the other 
                                                 
1
 Details on the association between values and ideological self-placement are reported in Caprara 
et al. (2017). Authors used the same set of data but focused on values and ideology, without 
considering religiosity. 
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countries, the unique contribution of religiosity was marginal or small (i.e., from 1 to 4% of 
explained variance).  
We linked cross-national variations in the strength of the relation between religiosity and 
ideology to the importance assigned to religion in each country, operationalized as the percentage of 
inhabitants who affirm that religion is an important part of their daily lives. We found an overall 
tendency for this relation to be stronger in countries where religion is more important [Spearman 
rank-order correlation between the increment in R-squared reported in the last column of Table 3 
and the percentage of citizens affirming that religion is important (Table 1, second column) was .45, 
p<.10].   
Moderation analysis 
We investigated whether the relation of religiosity with ideological self-placement is 
moderated by gender, age, and income. To this aim, a moderated regression analysis was performed 
in each of the examined countries. In this analysis, religiosity and the demographics were entered in 
the first step. Three interaction terms, representing the cross-product of religiosity with gender, age, 
and income were entered in the second step. All predictors were centered around their means prior 
to computing the interaction terms. Results showed no significant moderating effects. We can 
therefore conclude that the contribution of religiosity to ideological self-placement did not vary 
across participant's demographic conditions.  
Discussion 
Religion is a potent psychological and social force. History attests to the power of religion in 
supplying the worldview that is needed to cope with life and death for ordinary people, and the 
moral legitimacy to claim obedience for their rulers. Recent literature documents the associations of 
religion with subjective health and well-being (Diener, Tay & Myers, 2011; McCullough & 
Willoughby, 2009; Reed & Neville, 2014). Likewise, a vast literature points to the contribution that 
religiosity still exerts on the functioning of communities and society by fostering moral and 
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prosocial behaviour, by strengthening individual compliance with group norms and by promoting 
civic engagement (see Galen, 2012, for a critical review). 
The aim of the present study was to examine the pattern of relations between religiosity and 
ideological self-placement across 16 countries that differ significantly in the nature, history, and 
role of religion. As expected, religiosity was associated with right-wing and conservative ideologies 
in the vast majority of examined countries, despite the diversities of political offerings and of the 
dominant religion. This association was consistent across predominantly Roman Catholic (e.g. Italy, 
Poland, Spain), orthodox (Greece), protestant (U.K., Finland), Jewish (Israel) and Islamic (Turkey) 
populations. It is also worthy of note that age, gender, education, and income did not exert any 
moderating effect on the association between religiosity and political preference, further attesting 
the robustness and generality of this result. As stated earlier, we believe that the association 
between religiosity and ideology is due to the importance given by different religions to traditional 
values about authority, family, life and sex in shaping people’s world views, and thus in dictating 
their choices in the public sphere (Haidt, 2012).  
There were, however, important differences across countries in the strength of this 
relationship. Specifically, the association was stronger in countries like Greece, Italy, Israel, Poland, 
and Spain, where the majority religion had significantly influenced the moral education and 
socialization of children and the national identity of people. This occurred despite the different role 
religion might have played to sustain or to contrast the political regimes in power. In Spain, for 
example, religion has been a strong supporter of an authoritarian regime for over three decades 
during Franco's dictatorship. In Poland, religion has played a significant role in building the 
national identity and in fostering the transition towards democracy after the demise of real socialism.  
Whereas the effect that religiosity exert on ideological self-placement tend to be stronger in 
countries where religion is more important, many other relevant, contextual variables may 
contribute to explain the variability observed across countries. For example, religiosity is likely to 
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exert a major influence on political preference to the extent that it reflects deeply hold values about 
life and the government of society that accord or conflict with contingent political offerings. 
This study also examined how religiosity relates to basic personal values. In accordance 
with earlier studies (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2000; Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Saroglou et al., 2004), a 
consistent relationship was found between religiosity and value priorities, placing religion among 
the major allies of conservation. Specifically, religious people tended to assign high priority to self-
restraining values, which encourage preserving traditions, avoiding uncertainty, and submitting to 
others’ expectations (tradition, security, conformity), and low priority to values emphasizing 
independence in thought and action, receptiveness to change, and gratification of the senses (self-
direction, stimulation, hedonism).  
Most importantly for our purposes, we found that religiosity exhibits incremental validity for 
predicting ideology over basic values in most of the traditionally religious countries. In such 
countries, the impact of religion may have been strengthened and prolonged by socialization 
experiences in family and the school, which predispose to worldviews and moral values conducive 
to political ideologies that are most congenial to the dominant religion. In this regard one should 
keep in mind the special influence that religious authorities and hierarchies have exerted in people’s 
life within and beyond the religious domain. It is a topic for further investigation to examine the 
extent to which religiosity predisposes towards authority and hierarchy through beliefs and practices 
that are more congenial to a right ideology, or whether both religiosity and right-wing ideology rest 
upon common predispositions to obey authorities and trust into hierarchies.   
The unique contribution of religiosity to ideology, by contrast, was weaker in several secular 
countries (e.g., Australia, Finland, Japan, U.K.), where modernization has led to a significant 
decline of religious practice, where political institutions have long been independent of religious 
authority, and where moral education in schools is not committed to a special faith. In these 
countries, the choices people make in politics mostly reflect the values they cherish. 
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Our data do not allow us to disentangle the reciprocal influences between values and 
religiosity. Clarifying the extent to which religions influence people’s value priorities versus the 
extent to which people’s personal values influence their commitment to the religion they profess is 
a topic worthy of in-depth study. Likewise, the extent to which basic traits, needs and attitudes are 
associated to religiosity and ideology, and moderate their relationship, is worth of further 
investigation. Extending the study to broader samples representative of various constituencies of 
population is a further goal to be achieved by future studies.  
A potential limitation of the study is the use of a single-item to assess religiosity. Although 
this approach has been extensively applied in cross-cultural investigations of religiosity (Roccas & 
Schwartz, 1997; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995), it may fail to capture the complex ways in which 
religion and politics are related (Malka, 2013). The fact that most results are based on samples of 
convenience represent a further limitation of this study, that warns against the premature 
generalization of its findings. Yet, above findings converge in pointing to the current importance of 
religion in people’s political views. Although the practice of religion in church attendance and 
religious marriages has diminished in most Western countries, one should not underestimate the 
influence that religiosity may still exert in orienting citizens' political choices. Religious institutions, 
in fact, may still play an important role in established democracies either directly through their 
explicit or implicit support for certain parties or indirectly through emphasizing values that suggest 
giving priority and preference to particular political issues and platforms. 
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Table 1. Importance of religiosity and correlations with ideological self-placement. 
 Importance of religion  Correlations with ideological 
self-placement 
 Mean rating of 
religiousness 
(present study)1 
Is religion important? 
Percentage for ‘yes’ 
(2009 Gallup survey)2 
 Left-        
right  
Liberal-
conservative 
Australia 2.44 (SD= 1.90) 32%  .06 .01 
Brazil 3.91 (SD= 2.02) 87%  .21** .27** 
Chile 3.53 (SD= 1.96) 70%  .24** .33** 
Finland 2.63 (SD= 2.23) 28%  .30** .29** 
Germany  3.13 (SD= 2.14) 40%  .23** .20** 
Greece 3.56 (SD= 1.88) 71%  .45** .38** 
Israel 2.09 (SD= 2.18) 51%  .46** .53** 
Italy 3.22 (SD= 2.14) 72%  .39** .45** 
Japan 1.71 (SD= 1.92) 24%  .20** .02 
Poland 3.60 (SD= 1.75) 75%  .42** .43** 
Slovakia 3.56 (SD= 2.11) 47%  .25** .34** 
Spain 2.86 (SD= 2.09) 49%  .46** .48** 
Turkey 4.17 (SD= 1.66) 82%  .34** .38** 
Ukraine 4.02 (SD= 1.61) 46%  .15* .05 
UK 2.95 (SD= 1.98) 27%  .26** .31** 
US 3.02 (SD= 1.90) 69%  .25** .28** 
Notes. * p <. 05; ** p < .01. 1 “How religious, if at all, do you consider yourself to be?" (from 0 
= not at all religious, to 7= very religious). 2 “Is religion important in your daily life?” ("yes" or 
"no").   
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Table 2. Correlations of basic values with religiosity. 
 SE CO TR BE UN SD ST HE AC PO 
Australia .03 .12 .41** -.03 -.07 -.17* -.19* -.17* -.05 .08 
Brazil .11** .16** .44** .09* -.07 -.20** -.20** -.25** -.08 -.06 
Chile .15** .22** .46** .12 -.05 -.31** -.20** -.29** -.10 -.14* 
Finland .22** .17** .41** .03 .00 -.21** -.15** -.31** -.18** -.08 
Germany .04 .08* .48** .14** .03 -.15** -.22** -.23** -.12** -.04 
Greece .44** .19** .56** -.12 -.23** -.34** -.28** -.26** -.12 -.06 
Israel .09 .14** .60** .03 -.14** -.18** -.17** .21** .13** .14** 
Italy .21** .22** .44** .03 -.08 -.27** -.23** -.24** -.09 -.09 
Japan .13* .07 .20** .01 -.01 -.10 -.03 -.04 -.13* -.06 
Poland .15** .24** .44** .15** .13** -.15** -.19** -.29** -.29** -.28** 
Slovakia .03 .27** .52** .18** .05 -.21** -.26** -.27** -.25** -.14** 
Spain .19** .31** .46** -.02 -.23** -.31** -.15** -.24** -.09 .02 
Turkey .21** .23** .42** .12* .03 -.31** -.19** -.19** -.15** -.17** 
Ukraine .04 .01 .29** .12** .12** -.14** -.09 -.17** -.09 -.13** 
U.K. .15** .19** .56** .07 -.10 -.25** -.21** -.34** -.10 -.07 
U.S. .17** .23** .34** .08 .10 -.17** -.19** -.25** -.20** -.19** 
Notes. *p<.01; **p<.001; SE= Security; CO= Conformity; TR= Tradition; BE= Benevolence; UN= 
Universalism; SD= Self-direction; ST= Stimulation; HE= Hedonism; AC= Achievement; PO= 
Power. Before calculating correlation coefficients, persons’ responses were centered on their own 
mean rating of the 40 PVQ items. 
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Table 3. The unique contribution of religiosity to ideology, controlling for basic values and 
demographic variables. 
 Step 1:          
Demographics 
 Step 2:                              
Basic values  
Step 3:                  
Religiosity 
 F (df) R2  ΔF (df) ΔR2  ΔF (df) ΔR2 
Australia 1.73 (4, 232) .03  6.82 (10, 222)** .23  1.37 (1, 221) .00 
Brazil .50 (4, 878) .00  16.84 (10, 868)** .16  13.12 (1, 867)** .01 
Chile 7.23 (4, 387)**  .07  5.97 (10, 377)** .13  7.65 (1, 376)* .02 
Finland 6.52 (4, 424)** .06  16.12 (10, 414)** .26  19.84 (1, 413)** .03 
Germany  8.14 (4, 938)** .03  16.71 (10, 928)** .15  14.70 (1, 927)** .01 
Greece 3.67 (4, 350)** .04  11.94 (10, 340)** .25  39.96 (1, 339)** .08 
Israel 7.67 (4, 439)** .07  15.35 (10, 429)** .25  23.73 (1, 428)** .04 
Italy 2.25 (4, 496) .02  17.18 (10, 486)** .26  60.61 (1, 485)** .08 
Japan .47 (4, 290) .01  3.36 (10, 280)** .11  6.03 (1, 279)* .02 
Poland 2.06 (4, 666) .01  7.51 (10, 656)** .10  88.01 (1, 655)** .11 
Slovakia 1.65 (4, 448) .01  1.87 (10, 438)* .04  37.20 (1, 437)** .07 
Spain 3.36 (4, 352)** .04  8.00 (10, 342)** .18  58.29 (1, 341)** .11 
Turkey 6.07 (4, 464)** .05  4.28 (10, 454)** .08  30.82 (1, 453)** .06 
Ukraine 2.67 (4, 733)* .01  3.28 (10, 723)** .04  15,60 (1, 722)** .02 
U.K. 5.42 (4, 391)** .05  11.18 (10, 381)** .22  5.89 (1, 380)* .01 
U.S. 9.10 (4, 433)** .08  7.19 (10, 423)** .13  16.19 (1, 422)** .03 
 
Note. The outcome variable in the regression analyses is the liberal-conservative scale in the 
U.K. and in the U.S., and the left-right scale in all other countries.  
 21 
Acknowledgments 
The work of Jan Cieciuch was supported by Grant 2014/14/M/HS6/00919 from the National 
Science Centre, Poland.  
